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According to expressive law theories, expression of values is an important function played by the 
law. Expressive laws affect behavior, not by threatening sanctions or promising rewards, but by 
changing individual preferences and tastes and, in some cases, by affecting social norms and values. 
New laws, however, can run against sticky social norms, failing to achieve their expressive effects. 
By developing a dynamic model, in this paper we show that inexpressive laws (laws whose 
expressive function is undermined by sticky norms) can not only be ineffective but can push the 
values of society away from those expressed by the law. We study the effects of legal intervention 
on the values shared by members of society, considering the feedback effects between laws and 
social norms. Just like expressive laws can foster consensus in heterogeneous groups, inexpressive 
laws can create a social divide, even in previously homogeneous societies.  
 
JEL Classifications:  K10, K42, D70, B52, Z13.  
Keywords:  Social Norms, Countervailing Effect, Expressive Law, Civil 
Disobedience 
 
“I think we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to 
cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation 
which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right.” 
Henry David Thoreau (1849) 
 
“In a legal system structured as ours is, criminalization can work against the 
very norms on which it rests, meaning that popular norms may tend to move in 
the opposite direction from the law. Criminal law's relationship with popular 
norms may sometimes be perverse”  
William Stuntz (2000) 
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1.  Introduction 
Studies of individual behavior in response to legal commands generally support the 
argument that the law affects human choice by creating external incentives and promoting 
the individual internalization of the values expressed by the law. The economic model of 
law enforcement analyzes the incentives created by the relative prices of legal and illegal 
activities (Becker 1968, Polinsky and Shavell 2000a). By altering such relative prices, a 
more severe law will always induce individuals to substitute illegal activities with legal 
ones. The opposite, of course, will occur in case of new, more lenient laws. The growing 
expressive law literature (Cooter 1998 and 2000, McAdams 1997 and 2000), argues that the 
enactment of a new legal rule may lead individuals to internalize the values expressed by 
the law and trigger self-enforcement mechanisms that foster compliance, even in the 
absence of enforcement. 
According to both streams of literature, the law produces the effects intended by the 
legislator even if it fails to express the values shared by members of the society. In many 
situations, however, laws that depart from the current values of society may run against 
“sticky norms,” failing to produce the internalization and self-enforcement hypothesized by 
the expressive law literature and possibly leading to backlash effects (Kahan 1998 and 
2000). Recent work in experimental and behavioral law and economics provides several 
examples of this type of reaction to legal innovation.
1 
In this paper we consider the dynamic impact of the law in the presence of both 
internalization and backlash effects. We show that legal intervention which does not 
account for social reaction to legal innovation may not only be ineffective but may even 
have a negative impact. A law that introduces a new sanction, for example, may actually 
lead to an increase in the sanctioned behavior, as well as to a shift in social norms that goes 
in the opposite direction than the law. In the interest of linguistic symmetry, we shall refer 
to laws that fail in their expressive mission as “inexpressive laws.” Expressive law can lead 
to a convergence of views in society, leading to a consensus even among heterogeneous 
groups. Inexpressive law, to the contrary can trigger a social divide, such that a society that 
initially shares fairly homogeneous opinions may gradually split into two groups following 
opposite behavior and upholding different values. It is interesting to stress that inexpressive 
laws can exert their perverse effects even in the presence of enforcement. 
To understand how this can happen, one should consider how society may react 
when legal systems generate laws that do not reflect widespread consensus and are 
perceived as unjust. A legal rule may be perceived as unfair in two alternative ways – 
defect or excess. A law fails in defect when it is too lenient or when it does not provide 
adequate punishment for behavior that the people in that society consider harmful and 
                                                 
1 Gneezy and Rustichini (2003) provide experimental evidence of behavior opposite to that predicted 
by the deterrence model. Also, the results of their field study in day-care centers are widely known 
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000): they found that imposing a fine on parents who were late picking up 
their children resulted in a significant increase in the number of tardy parents. Bohnet, Frey and 
Huck (2001) present an experiment where increasing the probability of detection in environments 
with weak institutions crowds out virtuous social norms and trustworthy behavior.  
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undesirable; it fails in excess when it is too strict or it punishes a conduct that is perceived 
by members of society as harmless or even desirable. When the society views the legal 
sanction as too lenient relative to the preexisting social norm, individuals may be inclined 
to “add” social sanctions to the behavior (e.g. disapprobation or further punishing those 
committing the action targeted by the law). When society perceives the legal sanction as too 
harsh, individuals may be inclined to “subtract” social sanctions (e.g. approbation or 
tolerance of infringers) to the behavior. Particularly, the enactment of an “unjust” law may 
trigger public opposition that reveals social disapproval of that legal rule. If social 
disapproval of a new legal restriction is sufficiently strong, it may outweigh the incentive 
and expressive effects of the law and produce countervailing effects, i.e., outcomes 
opposite to those intended by the lawmaker.
2 
There are several real-life examples that illustrate our point, including those of file 
sharing and music download, terrorism and abortion, all of which have been characterized 
by countervailing effects in the course of time. We will present them in greater detail in 
Section 2. There are several other examples, including gender discrimination, army 
recruitment, drug and alcohol consumption, and smoking.
3  
Our results shed new light on the effects of legal intervention when the law conflicts 
with incumbent social norms. Lawmakers can avoid problem areas and adopt appropriate 
legal instruments for enacting new laws if they open themselves to an understanding of the 
characteristics of situations where countervailing effects are more likely. We may have 
paradoxical cases in which reducing the severity of a law may lead to a decrease in crime. 
1.1 Related Literature 
Our paper is related to the law and economics literature analyzing the interdependence 
between the law and social norms. First of all, our paper is related to the literature on 
expressive law (Cooter, 1998 and 2000). Expressive law theories revisit the traditional 
price-theory conceptions of law as an incentive mechanism, developing a richer theory of 
how legal rules can affect human behavior. According to expressive law theories, 
expression of values is an important function played by the law. Through expression the 
law can trigger the emergence of other incentives through the internalization of the values it 
embodies. Expressive laws affect behavior, not by threatening sanctions or promising 
rewards, but by changing individual preferences and tastes and, in some cases, by affecting 
social norms and values. This distinguishes expressive law theories from traditional 
                                                 
2 Public opposition may take several forms, from verbal expression of dissent to violent acts and 
illegal behavior either against enforcers in the case of too strict laws or against those who commit the 
action in case of too lenient laws. 
3 When searching for a common characteristic of all these examples, we notice a potential for social 
conflict and intergroup controversy. For instance, hardly anybody in a society thinks that armed 
robbery and violent crimes in general may be good or desirable for society. There may be a debate 
on how harsh punishment should be for a given crime but such debate on appropriate sentencing 
would not send any mixed signal with respect to the social disapproval for the action itself. It is 
however interesting to notice that some actions have been raised to the status of “uncontroversial 
crimes” only in recent times (e.g., honor crimes, indecent assault and harassment).  
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theories focused as they are on the role of law as an instrument for creating external 
incentives, such as taxes, sanctions and rewards. According to expressive law theories, 
internalized rules may trigger private enforcement mechanisms and change observed 
patterns of behavior even in the absence of other external incentives. Private enforcement 
mechanisms include first-party, second-party and third-party enforcement. These three 
interrelated mechanisms are important ingredients of the expressive effects of law. 
Expressive law theories, by shedding light on the role of law in shaping social values and 
norms, point to the relevance of legal intervention and the important responsibility of 
lawmakers as prospective norms-entrepreneurs.
 4 Opposing the expressive law view, Kahan 
(1998 and 2000), Lessig (1998) and McAdams (1995) argue that behavior signals one’s 
values and beliefs to others and can produce approval and acceptance in social groups. 
Outlawing behaviors with high signaling power will not have an impact on the prevalence 
of that particular behavior unless outlawing the behavior undermines intra-group approval. 
Kahan (2000) deals with the “sticky-norms problem”: when legislators enact laws aimed at 
changing existing social norms, often the likely result is the irrelevance of the law for 
behavior. In fact, enforcers may be reluctant to apply such legal changes, and their 
reluctance increases with the severity of the law. This leads to the policy prescription of 
using softer laws (what he calls “gentle nudges”) to revert social norms, i.e., moderate 
penalties. In Kahan’s (2000) analysis, however, “gentle nudges” may be more effective 
than hard laws (what he calls “hard shoves”), but in his setup, both forms of legal 
intervention are (weakly) better than no intervention (Kahan, 200, p. 619).
5 We show 
instead that laws triggering opposition may lead to countervailing effects. 
Our paper is related also to the law and economics literature analyzing social norms as 
an alternative to law in regulating behavior (Bernstein 1992, Ellickson 1991, Posner 2000, 
among others). Unlike this literature, however, we argue that social norms, when 
countervailing, can lead to violations of legal rules and to social unrest. 
Recent law and economics literature has brought to light cases in which the enactment 
of more severe laws produces effects opposite to those auspicated by the lawmaker. 
Particularly, higher sanctions may produce an increase in the sanctioned activity. This 
literature, however, does not consider the possible feedback between social and legal 
norms.
6 
                                                 
4 McAdams and Nadler (2005) provide experimental evidence that the law has the power to attract 
attention to particular actions, by publicly endorsing them. Thus, the law induces compliance by 
helping coordination around a focal equilibrium. 
5 Kahan’s model for example cannot be used and is “not meant to challenge the conventional 
economic premise that the level of crime varies inversely with the expected penalty for it.” (Kahan, 
2000, p. 619)   
6 For instance, Nussim and Tabbach (2009) show that larger punishment may increase crime if 
potential criminals invest in avoidance activities. Borck (2004) shows how stricter enforcement may 
increase tax evasion. With stricter enforcement, low income voters may prefer higher tax rates, since 
the tax system becomes more progressive. This may induce richer voters to evade more. Jost (2001) 
proves that increased investigation may increase the prevalence of illegal behavior, if the individual 




Our paper is linked to the literature on information cascades and opinion formation 
(Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch 1992 and 1998). It is also related to Kuran’s (1989) 
paper and (1995) book on sudden revolutions. Departing from Kuran’s contributions, 
whose results are based solely on the possible discrepancy between true and revealed 
preferences, we consider the process of endogenous formation of individual preferences 
and their interaction with action, the main target of our analysis. Moreover, in our model 
there is no incentive to misrepresent one’s preferences, as in Kuran’s.
7 The literature 
viewing social and legal norms as complements and substitutes is also related to our paper 
(Posner 1998, Zasu 2007). Differently from this literature, in our model social norms 
evolve as a result of legal innovation. 
Finally, Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) include a notion of the fairness of sanctions into 
the standard model of public enforcement. In their model, however, such notion of fairness 
is exogenous and is not influenced in any way by new legal rules. 
We organize the paper as follows: Section 2 presents some examples and case studies 
of countervailing norms. Section 3 models  the effects of legal change on human behavior. 
In Section 4, we describe how, in a dynamic setting, sticky norms eventually move, but 
sometimes, like a springboard, may trigger countervailing effects. We identify the 
conditions under which legal intervention may be counterproductive and where legal 
enforcement could generate negative net effects. Section 5 develops some extensions, 
discussing two effects that may entail sudden large reactions to legal change. We call them 
the announcement effect and the outcry effect. Consideration of these effects allows us to 
present in Section 6 policy strategies that may reduce the occurrence of countervailing 
norms. Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A provides proofs for the existence and 
stability of equilibria. Appendix B generalizes the model, whereas Appendix C contains 
some technical material. 
2.   Fairness of laws and legal compliance 
Laws can more easily achieve their goals when their content is in alignment with the 
existing social values. Studies of people’s behavior in response to laws generally support 
the argument that the alignment of legal precepts and decisions of authorities with current 
social values has a positive influence on compliance (Tyler, 1990, with respect to law; and 
Tyler & Huo, 2002, with respect to the decisions of authorities). The belief of individuals in 
the legitimacy of the legal system is of critical importance for compliance. Legitimacy is 
undermined when the content of the law departs from social norms, be they based on moral, 
ethical, or merely cultural values.
 8 
                                                 
7 The insurgence and outcomes of insurrections has been extensively analyzed also by Grossman 
(1995). His models, however, are static, general equilibrium models where well defined social 
groups (aristocracy, incumbent rulers, peasants, worker families) may be involved in a revolution 
when the level of predation by the incumbent rulers becomes intolerable. Grossman’s models never 
deal with social norms nor with mechanisms of opinions formation and his main concern is to study 
the redistribution of productive resources after insurrections. 
8 According to Tyler (1990, p. 25), legitimacy represents an “acceptance by people of the need to 
bring their behavior into line with the dictates of an external authority”.  
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As discussed in Section 1, a legal rule may be perceived as unfair for prohibiting a 
conduct that is perceived as harmless or desirable or when being too lenient and failing to 
prohibit behavior that is considered harmful and undesirable. Zwiebach (1975) provides 
examples of these two forms of civil disobedience. An example of the first form of 
disobedience is disobedience of laws perceived to be too restrictive and infringing upon 
constitutionally protected liberties. Examples range from the case of an African American 
person that refuses to sit in a segregated section of a courtroom, or a student wearing a 
black armband as a symbol of political protest in violation of school regulations, or a doctor 
prescribing birth control in violation of a state law. In each of these instances, violations of 
the law take place predominantly to assert dissatisfaction with the law, rather than to fulfill 
the violator’s selfish interest in breaching the law. The second form of reaction to law takes 
place when the law is too lenient and fails to protect individuals. In this case, a protester 
asserts that a right which current law does not recognize ought to be recognized, or that, if a 
law already exists, legal protection must be effectively implemented and enforced by 
authorities. Examples of this type exist in the various forms of protest in the area of human 
rights. Historically, this form of protest has been very valuable to society, allowing the 
gradual recognition and protection of new rights that would not easily arise through 
traditional political or lawmaking processes. 
Stuntz (2000) provides other interesting illustrations of the law’s impact on social 
norms. Stuntz considers how criminal law can defeat itself due to the lack of alignment 
between criminal laws and laypeople’s values and norms, generating disobedience rather 
than obedience. As the author describes it, the relationship between laws and social norms 
“is not always the relationship of car to driver or driver to car, but rather the relationship of 
one side of a seesaw to the other. To put the point simply, some crimes may be self-
defeating. Sometimes, the best way for the legal system to advance or reinforce norms may 
be to ignore them (Stuntz, 2000: 1872-73).”  Stuntz considers the examples of vice crimes 
(e.g. drinking during Prohibition, gambling) and highly divisive “morals” crimes (e.g. 
slavery), suggesting that the opposition to these laws was further exacerbated by the 
perception that these policies were driven by racial or class bias rather than moral justice, 
corroding the authority of the law for a larger portion of the public. 
Besides the examples already considered in the literature, we provide further 
illustrations of how the law can positively or negatively influence social norms, considering 
other situations where legal change triggered countervailing effects and reaction in behavior 
opposite to that normally expected. We try to distinguish cases where countervailing effects 
are produced by positive social sanctions from cases where negative social sanctions 
triggered the undesired consequences. 
A first example that has dominated the news several times in recent years is the impact 
that restrictive copyright laws have had on the amount of file sharing via peer-to-peer 
technologies over the internet. There are several empirical papers showing that legal 
enforcement has had an unintended effect. For instance, Depoorter and Vanneste (2005) 
and Oksanen and Välimäki (2007) provide evidence of an increase in file sharing after the  
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music companies started suing users of peer-to-peer technology for illegal downloading. In 
this example, we have all the elements required by our model: the increase in sanctions 
against downloaders of illegal files sparked protest both inside the community of file 
sharers and outside of it.
9 This revealed that the prevailing social norm admitted file sharing 
and encouraged more people to engage in the activity and to increase the level at which 
they performed it. In fact, in the summer 2003, the RIAA started suing an increasing 
number of people for downloading and sharing music files. There was strong negative 
reaction and protest among both music downloaders and non-downloaders. An OECD 
report issued in 2004 shows that the number of users of peer-to-peer technologies has 
continued to grow between 2002 and 2004 notwithstanding attempts to stop this 
phenomenon with increasingly severe sanctions.
10 Moreover, Depoorter, Parisi and 
Vanneste (2005) provide experimental findings indicating that legal sanctioning of file 
sharing produces a backlash effect on norms and, consequently, on behavior. “If sanctions 
have a countervailing effect”, they conclude “exclusive reliance on punishment might be 
unfortunate.”
11 
A second episode, where protest itself was criminalized and, as a result, protest 
increased (albeit temporarily) can be found in West Germany, in the 1970s, when a high 
level of terrorist activity was observed. In an attempt to reduce terrorism, criminal law and 
criminal procedural law were made substantially stricter in all fields related to terrorism. 
Not only was the founding of and membership in a terrorist organization penalized, but the 
“support of, or recruitment for” such organizations was also penalized. All suspects in pre-
trial custody and inmates found guilty of violating these provisions were (or could be) 
subjected to severe restrictions of their rights as prisoners. In the first years after enactment, 
the new law was used in a relatively large number of cases, in particular to sanction lesser 
forms of support of terrorism that could not be subsumed to any other criminal offense. The 
effect, though, was a clear increase in the openly expressed opposition against these laws.  
At the same time, there was an increase in the number of individuals actively criticizing 
custody conditions of terrorists and in the number of individuals supporting terrorists in 
more severe ways.  All this was encouraged by an increasing number of persons opposing 
to the strict stance the state took on such activities.
 12 
Finally, we have an example of a countervailing effect that produced a reinforcement 
of the law. The promulgation of laws supporting a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy 
has given rise to political and social battles over abortion rights in many countries. In the 
US, this happened in 1973, with the Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade. This decision 
has sparked and still provokes much protest by prolife groups. Protest ranges from open 
expression of dissent to attempts to directly discourage or prevent women from having 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, postings on the New York Times after a woman from Minnesota was found liable 
for copyright infringement for sharing music online and condemned to pay a fine of $222,000 in 
damages (see Leeds 2007: http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/sued-for-sharing-music/.) 
10 See Depoorter and Svanneste (2005) and Oksanen and Välimäki (2007). 
11 Depoorter, Parisi and Vanneste (2005), pag. 367. 
12 See Oppenheimer (1978).  
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access to abortion services. Such attempts are sometimes classifiable as true harassment and 
include chemical attacks, death threats and even homicide. There is empirical evidence that 
such antiabortion activities have had a significant impact both on the supply and on the 
demand of abortion services in the US, which would have been higher in the absence of 
protest of antiabortion activists (Kahane, 2000).
13 
3.   The Model 
Imagine a simple framework, where there is an action a, which the law can either allow or 
forbid. For instance, we might think of actions like smoking in public spaces, illegally 
copying recorded music, carrying out abortions, or supporting terrorists by advocating their 
freedom of expression and public communication. We assume that in the initial period 
action a is legal and that in a subsequent period a new law is enacted, which forbids a and 
levies a sanction S. The sanction can vary in both its severity and frequency of application. 
For simplicity, we assume risk-neutrality and define S as the expected sanction in case of 
non-compliance. A value S = 0 means a law without a sanction, whereas S becomes larger 
as the severity of the sanction or the probability of its enforcement increase.
14 The primary 
effect of a sanction is to deter individuals from engaging in the illegal behavior. Sanctions 
increase the relative price of the illegal conduct and possibly lead to a substitution towards 
other legal activities. The decision to carry out the action, however, depends not only on the 
legal sanction, but also on the value individuals assign to the action and on current social 
norms. 
In line with Bicchieri (2006), we define social norms as informal rules followed by a 
sufficiently large subset of the population and supported by normative expectations (i.e., 
individuals believe that a sufficiently large subset of the population expects them to 
conform and may sanction deviations). In our model, both current behavior and expressed 
opinions constitute a “social norm indicator”. This, we believe, is a more realistic 
assumption than letting individuals learn social norms either from behavior (as in Kahan 
2000) or from expressed opinions only (Kuran 1989 and 1995). People may in fact be 
confused by the mere consideration of observed behavior, which may be motivated by self 
interest (e.g., crime).
15 
We now turn to defining individual behavior and expressed opinions and to 
characterize the interdependence of individual choices, social norms and the law. 
                                                 
13 The evidence provided by Kahane (2000) is not without counterexamples in the literature. For 
instance, Oltmans Ananat, Gruber and Levine (2004) provide evidence that the legalization of 
abortion has produced a decline in fertility rates of women who had their peak childbearing years 
during the early 1970s. The interpretation of this evidence is, however, problematic. The reduction in 
fertility could be attributable to better access to contraceptive techniques and to the information that 
was made available to women after the legalization of abortion. 
14 A negative value of S would be a subsidy to the activity. We refrain from discussing this case in 
detail, but our results could be easily extended in this direction. 
15 If expressed opinions and behavior diverge (e.g., the majority of the people voices the opinion that 
corruption is bad but still corruption is pervasive), the indication about the appropriate behavior may 
become blurry and decisions are more and more based on individual beliefs and material payoffs.  
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For expositional ease, we write the individual valuation of the action as B-va, where 
B is a common value for all individuals and va is the individual deviation from this common 
value.
16 B-va  is therefore the benefit that an individual derives from committing the action. 
We assume that va varies among individuals according to the distributions function G(va), 
with the corresponding density g(va). Analytically, this implies that all those with 
  a B vS nx β α − >+ −  (1) 
choose to carry out the action, where α and β are non-negative constants and measure the 
weight that the individual attaches to social norms in the utility function. Particularly, α is 
the weight attached to expressed aggregate social norms (defined by n, a variable that we 
shall explain in detail shortly), whereas β is the weight attached to observed behavior 
(defined by x, the proportion of individuals carrying out the action). Then the proportion of 
people who are willing to violate the law and engage in the sanctioned behavior in a given 
period is G(B-S-βn+αx). The choice to engage in the illegal behavior adapts over time 
according to changes in the current state. Thus, given x, the change in the proportion of 
individuals carrying out the illegal action in each period is 
  ( ) x GB S n x x βα = −− + −   (2) 
where the dot denotes the derivative with respect to time.
17 
We further assume that each person also assigns a normative valuation vn to the 
activity, where vn can be interpreted as the size of the legal sanction that the person deems 
appropriate for the action. The lower the normative valuation of the activity, the less an 
individual would like to see the action being performed by others and hence the larger her 
most preferred sanction vn. Let the distribution of normative valuations in the society be 
given by F(vn), with density f(vn).
18 The individual values of vn and their distribution in 
society are initially opaque, but can be revealed to others through the expression of 
opinions and social reaction to action a and to laws regulating and sanctioning a. Opinions 
and social reaction can either express approval or disapproval and contribute to the 
establishment of social norms. 
Let q be the proportion of individuals who disapprove action a to the point of 
actually manifesting discontent and protest against the law at time t for being too lenient, 
considering the sanction for action a to be too small. Similarly, let p be the proportion of 
individuals who approve action a to a degree that they would manifest discontent and 
protest against the law at time t, or otherwise openly support violations of the law by others, 
                                                 
16 We do not place any restrictions on va, so that it may be positive or negative and we can, for 
example, interpret B as the average benefit of the activity. 
17 We omitted the time index for notational simplicity. In equation (2) the pace of this adaptation has 
been normalized by defining time periods so that only one individual gets to decide each time. We 
have then assumed continuous time. 
18 It is highly likely that the values va and vn are correlated. In general, we would expect va and vn to 
be positively correlated: if an individual has a low vn, she is also likely to carry out a. Positive 
correlation allows individuals to infer normative valuations of others not only from their expressed 
opinions but also from their actions. However, to keep our model as general as possible, we do not 
assume any form of correlation and consider va and vn as independent.  
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because they deem the sanction for action a to be inappropriate or excessively high. We 
define the aggregate expressed social norm at time t as n qp = − . That is, the expressed 
social norm with respect to action a is given by the difference between the rates of social 
disapproval and approval for a. 
Expressed opinions and the extent to which individuals are willing to reveal their 
values by supporting or opposing a legal rule changes over time to respond to the current 
state of the society. To understand their dynamic evolution, one should consider that the 
expression of opinions and protest are costly. Some of these costs are financial opportunity 
costs, like taking time off work or leisure to express one’s opinions and protesting against 
an unjust law. Some others are psychological costs, like the cost of expressing opinions 
contrary to prevailing social norms inferred from the opinions expressed by others or from 
their behavior. The psychological costs of protest will be lower when an individual’s 
preference regarding action a and her possible dislike of the law are in line with the 
opinions of many other members of the society. Thus, an individual with a preference for a 
stricter law will be willing to express her opinion only when the utility she derives from 
such stricter law is high enough to offset the costs of expression, i.e. when 
  nt vS c n x λ γ − >− +   (3) 
Similarly, an individual preferring a more lenient law will express her opinion only when 
  nt t Sv c n x λ γ − >+ −   (4) 
The right-hand side of the last two inequalities represents the total cost of expression and 
protest and consists of a constant part, c, and a variable part depending on current social 
norms. The parameters λ≥0 and γ≥0 respectively measure the impact of expressed social 
norms and others’ behavior on the individual’s cost of protest.  
The proportion of individuals voicing their preference for a stricter law will 
therefore be  ( ) 1 tt F Sc n x λ γ −+ − +, whereas the proportion of those voicing a preference 
for a more lenient law therefore becomes  ( ) tt F Sc n x λ γ −− + . The dynamic process of 
opinion expression may thus be represented by the two equations 
  ( ) ( ) 1 qF S c n x q σλ γ = −+ − + −   (5) 
and  
  ( ) ( ) pF S c n x p σλ γ = −− + −   (6) 
where σ  is the number of individuals expressing their opinion in every time period.
19 
Combining equations (5) and (6), expressed opinionsnqp = −  evolve over time 
according to the following dynamics: 
  ( ) ( ) () 1 nF S c n x F S c n x n σλ γλ γ =− − − +− + − +−  . (7) 
                                                 
19 Recall that, in equation (2), we assumed that only one individual per period decided whether to 
take action a. As individuals may decide on the expression of their opinions faster or more slowly 
than on their actions, we introduce the parameter σ. If σ  > 1, opinions change faster than actions. 
The opposite occurs if σ <1.  
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To simplify the graphical presentation of this problem, we note that the dynamic system 
consisting of equations (2) and (7) perfectly reflects the dynamic system consisting of 
equations (2) through (6), both with respect to the location and the stability of the 
equilibria.
20 
  By definition, the equilibria of the system are reached when both the proportion of 
individuals carrying out action a and the proportion of individuals expressing their opinion 
become constant over time, i.e. when  0 x n = =   . Not all equilibria defined in this way need 
to be stable, but only the stable equilibria will be relevant in the remaining analysis. 
In order to simplify the presentation of our results, we introduce some 
assumptions.
21  Particularly, we assume that α=0 in equation (2), meaning that the choice of 
carrying out action a does not depend on x, and λ=0 in equation (5), meaning that the 
change in opinions is not influenced by the current social norm.  
Equations (2) and (7) therefore reduce to 
  ( ) x GB S n x β = −− −   (2’) 
and  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 nF S c x F S c x n σγγ =− − +− + +−  . (7’) 
By posing  0 x =   in equation (2’) we define the equilibrium proportion of individuals 
carrying out action a as a function of the current social norm: 
  ( ) ( ) x nG B S n β
∗ =− −  (8) 
and by posing  0 n =   in equation (7’) we define the equilibrium social norm as a function of 
the current proportion of individuals who engage in activity a: 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 nx FS c x FS c x γ γ
∗ =− −+ − ++  (9) 
We further assume that both  ( ) f ⋅  and  ( ) g ⋅  are uni-modal and rather concentrated 
around the mode. Finally, we assume that the cost parameter c is small. The latter two 
assumptions guarantee that both functions  ( ) x n
∗  and  ( ) nx
∗  have the shape depicted in 
Figure 1 (reverse S-shape). Since equilibria are defined as the values of x and n that solve 
0 x =   and  0 n =   simultaneously, they are located where the functions  () x n
∗  and  () nx
∗  
intersect. Figure 1 provides an example with three equilibria, where stable equilibria are 
represented by black circles and unstable ones by empty circles, as one may infer from the 
arrows denoting the directions of the dynamics described by equations (2’) and (7’).
22 
We should note that the equilibria need not be so nicely distributed across the entire 
range of x and n, but may instead be very concentrated, for example in the upper left quarter 
of Figure 1, which would be the case if about one half of the population would never carry 
                                                 
20 Proof in Appendix A. 
21 Our results do not hinge upon the simplifying assumptions used in this Section. These assumptions 
will be relaxed in Appendix B, where we will generalize our model showing that the nature of our 
results does not change. 
22 The shape of the functions x
*(n) and n




out the action and never protest against the law for being too strict. Clearly, a uni-modal 
distribution implies that the majority of individuals share the same behavior and beliefs. It 
is therefore interesting to find that, starting from such an initial distribution, the system can 
end up in equilibria where society is split in two distinct groups: some individuals whose 
prior values were closer to the new law become law-abiders, while other individuals whose 
prior values were further away from the new law react, moving away from the law and 
converging to a law-violation behavior. This would happen, for instance, if all three 
equilibria were close to the x – axis. In such a case, legal intervention triggers a social 
divide, so that a society that initially shares fairly homogeneous opinions splits into two 
groups following opposite behavior and upholding different opinions.
23 
 
4.   Feedback and Social Reaction: Rethinking the Effects of Legal Intervention 
 
In this Section we study the impact that the incentives created by sanctions and social 
norms have on deterrence when the adoption of a new law generates “social feedback.” 
When legal intervention triggers social feedback, both the reinforcement of a legal sanction 
and the enactment of more lenient laws can have countervailing effects on behavior, 
increasing criminal activities or reducing prevalence of an activity that the legislator would 
like to encourage. 
We shall proceed by considering the feedback between expressed opinions n and action 
x when a lawmaker implements an increase in the severity of the sanction S. From equation 







= −⋅ <   (10) 
whereas the change in protest for any level of x is, from equation (9) 




fSc g x fS cg x
dS
= −− + + + + <   (11) 
Thus, an increase in S produces a decrease in x for any given level of n and also a 
decrease in n, due to the simultaneous increase in the protest for law strictness p, and 
decrease in the protest for a too lenient law, q. In fact, all other things being equal, a higher 
S reduces the expected payoff from committing the action and, for any given social norm n, 
reduces the proportion of individuals carrying out a. Similarly, an increase in S would make 
it less likely that an individual with valuation vn expresses an opinion in favor of a stricter 
law (thus decreasing q
*) and would instead increase individual incentives to protest for the 
excessive strictness of the newly enacted law, thus increasing p
*.  
To understand how countervailing effects may arise, let us suppose that initially the 
social system is in the equilibrium marked as  1 e  in Figure 2. In  1 e the value of n is relatively 
high (meaning that the proportion q of people protesting for a stricter law is relatively 
                                                 
23 Such result would be all the more likely if we started from a bimodal distribution, as we argue in 
Appendix A. By assuming a uni-modal distribution, we therefore put ourselves in the most difficult 
initial conditions.  
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higher than the proportion p of people expressing the opposite opinion) and x is low. 
Assume now that the legislator passes a new law increasing the sanction S to S’. According 
to equations (10) and (11), the function  ( ) x n
∗  shifts leftwards to  ( ) x n




moves downwards. Following a (possibly small) increase in the sanction S, if the 
function  () nx
∗
 
shifts much more than the function  ( ) x n
∗  in response to the legal change 
(like in the situation illustrated in Figure 2, where  ( ) nx
∗  moves to  ( )
* nx   ), then the only 
equilibrium would be  3 e   , where x is high and n is negative and relatively large (implying p 
much greater than q). This implies that the direct feedback in norm formation is large and 
clearly larger than the feedback in action decisions.
24 Hence, the proportion of individuals 
carrying out the action would increase substantially and the social norm would turn sharply 
against the law. 
A similar effect (though opposite in sign) could be observed in case of a reduction in 
the sanction S. In that case, the function  ( ) x n
∗  would move rightward, whereas  () nx
∗  
would shift up. If the shift in  ( ) nx
∗  were much larger than the move in  () x n
∗ , we could 
observe a transition towards a state in which the number of people actively protesting 
against the law for being too lenient increases substantially and the proportion of 
individuals who choose to carry out the action decreases notwithstanding the more 
permissive law. 
In both cases presented above, the countervailing effects of legal innovation occur as 
the social reaction is so strong to produce a positive net effect of legal sanctions on 
deterrence. If the shift in the function  ( ) nx
∗  were smaller (so that  ( ) nx
∗  moved to  () nx
∗  ), 
starting from equilibrium e1, society would reach  1 e   and not 
3 e   , and no countervailing 
effect would occur. In equilibrium  1 e   in Figure 2, although protest against the strictness of 
the law increases (and n decreased compared to the initial equilibrium  1 e ) such an increase 
is not enough to compensate for the incentive effect of a higher S, so that the change in the 
law reduces x. 
Copyright infringement by participants to peer-to-peer networks is one case in which 
the reaction to stricter sanctions and enforcement produced countervailing effects. The 
empirical evidence suggests that individuals who engage in file sharing do not generally 
consider their activities as serious copyright violations that would justify a criminal 
sanction and often regard them as means to damage corporations, seen as entities with 
monopoly power which they use to take advantage of consumers (see Depoorter, Parisi and 
Svanneste 2005 and Oksanen and Välimäki 2007). In terms of our model this implies that 
                                                 
24 In terms of equations (2) and (7) this is equivalent to requiring that the parameter γ  is much 
smaller than the parameter β , i.e., that the influence of observed action on social norms is much 
weaker than the reverse influence, and that the parameter λ  is large, so that there is larger direct 
feedback in norm formation than in action-decisions.  
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in the face of strict copyright enforcement, n is very low, possibly negative.
25 Moreover, the 
parameter β in equation (8) is likely to be high, meaning that behavior is very sensitive to 
expressed social norms. 
The results of the above analysis thus suggest that sudden and extreme changes in 
social norms can lead to sudden large reactions in behavior. In the framework we have 
presented so far, such extreme changes are persistent and protest does not subside over 
time. In the next Section, we shall present alternative explanations for the countervailing 
effects of legal sanctions on actual behavior, explanations that do not necessarily require a 
persistent increase in protest and might provide a “microfoundation” for the different speed 
in the reaction of social norms and actions. 
5.   The Countervailing Effect of Legal Announcements and Public Outcry  
In this Section, we discuss the conditions that may entail large reactions to minor legal 
changes. All conditions we describe are based on the countervailing effects of social protest 
and are observed when the initial enforcement of a new legal sanction has a greater or faster 
impact on protest than on the level of compliance (action). According to their theoretical 
basis, we call these effects the “announcement effect” and the “outcry effect.” 
a.  Delaying the Entry into Force of Law: The Announcement Effect 
Changes in the law are usually announced some time before a new law takes effect, at least 
in the case of statutory law. When a new law is announced but has not yet come into force, 
it is generally unable to produce any direct deterrent effect on current behavior.
26 The 
announcement effect occurs when the announced law, although not yet effective, triggers 
an immediate reaction of social norms. When a new law comes into force with some lag, 
social norms may react to the legal change before the new law is able to produce its 
incentive effects. When the law eventually comes into force, it will be applied to a modified 
environment. Anticipatory protest may guide the social system into a different equilibrium 
from that we could expect when incentives and social reaction materialize simultaneously. 
In terms of our model, the announcement of a more severe law would shift the relevant 
equilibrium schedule leftwards (from  ( ) nx
∗  to  ( ) nx
∗  ), some time before the corresponding 
downward shift of  () x n
∗  to  ( ) x n
∗   follows. Consider a social system similar to that 
described by the equilibrium labeled  1 e  in Figure 2, where the prevalence of “crime” before 
the legal change is limited and n is positive and relatively large, revealing a strong approval 
                                                 
25 This conjecture is validated by evidence that support for file sharers caught and fined in court is 
strong and opposing voices very few. For instance, Oksanen and Välimäki (2007) report the case of 
an American teenager who created a search engine for music files. He was discovered, sued by 
RIAA (the Recording Industry Association of America), and forced to settle his case for $12,000, an 
amount which equaled his entire savings for college. This case provoked the angry reaction of the 
file-sharing community, which organized a fund-raising campaign that raised enough money to pay 
the settlement. 
26 This is especially true when the new legislation is not retroactive and is thus unable to have effects 
on behavior which takes place before its entry into force.  
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for strict laws. Now suppose that an increase in the sanction is announced, with a delayed 
implementation. Prior to the entry into force, behavior is not yet deterred by the new 
sanctions (the schedule  () x n
∗  still describes the levels of x towards which the system is 
drawn for given values of n), but is already affected by the observed social reaction, 
characterized by a quick increase in the protest against the stricter law (p  increases, 
reducing n, so that  () nx
∗  shifts downwards, to  ( ) nx
∗  ). The schedules  () x n
∗  and  () nx
∗   
intersect only once at  3 e   and, in the transitional period, the dynamics of behavior and 
protest is driven towards this unique equilibrium. Expressed opinions will become 
increasingly less supportive of the high sanction and, as a consequence, social norms will 
evolve against the law, driving behavior in the opposite direction. Once the higher legal 
sanction becomes effective,  () x n
∗  shifts downward to  ( ) x n
∗   and the social system would 
stay in the region of attraction of equilibrium  3 e  . As a result of the increase in the sanction, 
the frequency of the illegal activity in society would ironically increase and social norms 
would develop against strict laws and possibly in support of the illegal activity. 
It is worth noting that legal rules produced through legislation (and civil law systems in 
general) are more vulnerable to announcement effects than judge-made law. The 
announcement effect is in fact typical of legislative processes that have to undergo complex 
procedures and have formal publication requirements, which is typical of codified law and 
parliamentary systems. Judge-made rules and common law rules in general become instead 
known to society through the court decision, without prior notice. This clearly eliminates 
the time lag and announcement effect that may exacerbate the rise of countervailing social 
norms. However, this by no means implies that common law courts can ignore the 
countervailing effects of their decisions. 
b.  Getting Used to Unjust Law: The Outcry Effect 
Laws perceived as excessively strict or even unjust when enacted could later become 
tolerated and eventually accepted. The initial outcry triggered by more severe sanctions 
may eventually give way to acceptance and perhaps even internalization. In other words, 
initially sharp reactions and changes in the expressed social norm may fade away over time. 
The initial strong reaction, however, although temporary, may change the values of society 
and move it towards a different equilibrium, exactly as happens with the announcement 
effect. 
  Consider a situation where a new law is passed, increasing the prescribed sanction 
from a given level S0 to a level S > S0. Assume that both q and p depend not only on the 
absolute size of the sanction S (as they did before), but also on how much it changed 
relative to the original value S0. Formally, this assumption is introduced in our model by 
adding a term  t S κ Δ  to the size of the (changed) sanction S in the inequalities describing 
the decisions to express one’s opinion. Then equation (7’) becomes 
  () ( ) () 1 tt t t t t nF S S c x F S S c x n σκ γ κ γ =− + Δ − +− + Δ + +−  , (7’’)  
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where  0 SSS Δ=−  is the size of the change in the legal sanction and  0 S is the level of the 
sanction prior to legal change. The parameter  0 t κ >  measures the way in which the 
change in S impacts protest at time t. 
  The outcry effect captures the fact that society reacts not only when a new law 
introduces a sanction that public opinion perceives to be unjust, but also when the new law 
departs substantially from the previous state of the law. For instance, if a given criminal 
action such as substance abuse was previously punished with six months in jail and then a 
new law is passed increasing the sanction to five years, public opinion will react much 
more than in the case where the sanction is raised from four to five years. Ceteris paribus, 
an unjust law will trigger a larger social reaction if it represents also a substantial departure 
from the prior state of the law. 
  The assumption that social norms react not only to the objective severity of the law 
but also to the extent of the change from prior law implies that people adjust to the law over 
time, even to those laws that were initially perceived as unjust. The social acceptance (or 
internalization) of the law could be a relatively slow process, and implies that  0 t κ <  . 
Restating this in words, internalization implies that society progressively reacts less to the 
difference between the new law and the original standard S0. 
In terms of Figure 2, then, public outcry causes a temporary shift of the function 
() nx
∗   to  () nx
∗   . This effect partially withers away as time elapses (and the social-norm 
equilibrium schedule moves back to 
*() nx  , while  ( ) x n
∗  only shifts to  () x n
∗  ). Then, as was 
the case for the announcement effect, the system tends towards the equilibrium described 
by the intersection of  ( ) nx
∗    and  ( ) x n
∗  , labeled  3 e    in the Figure 2. If the stronger initial 
reaction persists for a sufficiently long time, then the system would find itself in the region 
of attraction of  3 e   even when the unjust law is eventually accepted and the dynamics of the 
system is described by  ( ) nx
∗   and  ( ) x n
∗  . At that point, a low-activity equilibrium with 
social norms closely aligned with the content of the law may emerge, as described in the 
figure by  1 e  , but the system remains close to  3 e   and, absent further disturbances, will reach 
this equilibrium. 
The idea behind the outcry effect is straightforward. Recent experience of an 
excessively strict law induces a wave of protest that fades away as individuals get used to 
the higher legal sanction. Similar to what we observed with the announcement effect, such 
wave of protest may shift the social system to an equilibrium characterized by higher levels 
of violations and protest compared to the levels that preceded legal intervention. 
This dynamic could explain the reaction that took place during the late seventies in 
West Germany, where many people engaged in public protest for the extreme increase in 
the sanctions for the ideological support of terrorism and the corresponding decline in 
procedural safeguards for individuals charged with these alleged crimes. The strong 
reaction triggered by the enforcement of these laws led to the expression of empathy for  
17 
 
jailed suspects, and eventually led to a widespread opposition of those laws by a greater 
number of individuals. While the discussion became less intense after some time (i.e., 
public outcry  t S κ Δ  vanished over time) a large number of people still opposed the new 
laws and many continued to express solidarity with the individuals accused or convicted for 
ideological support of terrorism until the eighties. 
  Similar effects may have played in the upsurge of violent reprisals against women 
seeking abortions and doctors practicing these procedures, discussed above. To describe the 
dynamics in this latter case, one should consider that the law allowing for abortion (where 
no pregnancy termination was legally admitted before) is equivalent to setting more lenient 
legal standards. In this case, we can assume that n is initially positive or near zero.
27 The 
decrease in S moves the functions x*(n) upward and n*(x) rightward in Figure 3. However, 
in this case society is likely to perceive  S Δ  to be very large, since the law represented a 
sudden change from prohibition to liberalization (although with some restrictions) of 
abortions. This may have the effect of raising a considerable outcry in the prolife group, 
temporarily moving n*(x) to such extent that the only possible equilibrium could be found 
in the most leftward intersection of 
*() x n   and 
*() nx   , labeled  1 e    in Figure 1. 
6.   Overcoming the Reverse Effects of Legal Intervention 
In the previous Sections, we have shown how changes in the law can trigger changes in 
social norms, producing countervailing effects and backlash. In all the cases of 
countervailing effects described above, the unexpected impact of legal innovation is due to 
the triggering of protest leading to changes in social norms that dominate relatively milder 
responses in behavior through incentives or deterrence. Countervailing effects are less 
likely to occur when lawmakers avoid drastic departures from current social norms and 
sharp changes from current law. This may imply applying lower initial sanctions when 
restricting a previously unregulated behavior, or carrying out only a partial liberalization of 
a previously restricted behavior.
28 
Particularly, piecemeal legislation and sunset clauses are especially effective 
strategies in case of potential announcement and outcry effects, since they might avoid or 
reduce the surge in protest. In the case of the announcement effect, the increase of protest 
between the time in which the new law is announced and the time in which it comes into 
effect is limited if the new law remains relatively close to the status quo. Due to the weak 
initial protest, the system would remain in the basin of attraction of the desired final 
equilibrium, regardless of the duration of the transitional phase. By introducing legal 
                                                 
27 Medoff (2002) finds that voter preferences in abortion issues are bimodal. This implies that there 
are two active groups lobbying for opposite legal provisions. In terms of our model, this can be 
represented by q and p being rather similar, with society almost evenly split between prochoice and 
prolife groups and n near zero. 
28 We illustrate the dynamic interaction between social and legal norms without venturing into 
welfare analysis. Whether incumbent social norms or innovative legislation are more likely to result 




change in small consecutive steps, piecemeal legislation can carry out substantive changes 
in the law over time. Subsequent increases in the legal sanction would trigger an increase in 
protest, but this reaction would take place in an environment characterized by the higher 
levels of compliance obtained in the previous phase. The same legislative strategies would 
also work in the case of a possible outcry in response to a change in the law. Consider, for 
instance, the case in which the lawmaker wants to implement a substantial increase in 
sanction (from S0 to S1, with S0 << S1). In order to avoid an initial surge in protest with 
possible countervailing effects, the government may initially change the sanction from S0 to 
S2, with S0 < S2 < S1. Assume that the initial equilibrium is e1 in Figure 2. Crime and protest 
would then reach a short-term equilibrium in  1 e  . Individuals would then gradually adjust to 
the new legal rule and the final equilibrium will be a point along 
*() x n   and above  1 e  , with 
a lower crime rate, as κtΔS becomes smaller and smaller over time and 
*() nx   shifts up. The 
government could then move from S2 to S1. Given that also this second legal change has a 
small ΔS, there will be a limited increase in protest. This would allow the lawmaker to 
reach a long-run equilibrium with even less crime and only a slight decrease in n. In this 
way, the lawmaker can avoid countervailing effects by introducing stepwise legislation.
29 
The second possible strategy the lawmaker could adopt to avoid countervailing 
social norms is the enactment of temporary legislation and sunset clauses. When legislation 
contains a sunset provision, the effects of the law terminate after a specific date, unless the 
effectiveness of the law is extended by legislative action.
30 The adoption of sunset clauses 
potentially reduces protest and prevents the realization of announcement and outcry effects. 
People in fact rely on the fact that, when a new law is temporary, its effects will 
automatically end, unless the law is reenacted or expressly extended.  This may have the 
effect of decreasing protest in the transition period before the law is actually in place, 
reducing the impact of the announcement effect. Similarly, sunset clauses, by limiting the 
period of time during which an “unjust law” is implemented, have the likely effect of 
decreasing  t κ , thus lowering the impact of the change  S Δ  on protest.
31 
Two additional ways to tame the reaction triggered by the announcement of a new 
law would entail (i) shortening the lag between the enactment and the entry into force of the 
                                                 
29 Things would change in a world of forward-looking individuals. With rational expectations, 
individuals would anticipate that the final objective of the legislator is S1 and would tailor their 
protest to such expected final level and not to the initial level. With perfectly rational individuals 
who are able to foresee the entire legislative scheme, other legislative strategies should be considered 
to control countervailing effects. 
30 Temporary legislation consists of statutes containing clauses limiting the duration of their validity. 
Such clauses are usually termed “sunset clauses”. Sunset clauses operate as a sort of termination date 
beyond which the law will expire and the sanction will go back to its original level. For analysis of 
the effects of other timing rules, see Gersen and Posner (2007) and Luppi and Parisi (2009). 
31 This was the strategy used by Congress when the U.S. Patriot Act was passed on October 24, 
2001, just a few weeks after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Although 
the Patriot’s Act was approved almost with no dissent in the aftermath of September 11, the law was 
set to expire in the year 2005. This was due to strong criticism that the Act excessively weakened the 
protection of civil liberties. After its “sunset”, the bill was reauthorized (with no substantial change) 
in March 2006 (see Koh in The Economist, 30
th October 2003).  
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law, and (ii) recur to executive legal intervention. Both these strategies reduce the transition 
period. Executive legal intervention allows the government to promulgate a law that is 
immediately enforceable, even if it has later to be confirmed by the parliament. The 
incentive effects of legal intervention would then not be diluted or reversed by the 
announcement effect.
 32 
  Finally, when the legislator wants to avoid countervailing effects, (pigouvian) taxes 
or, possibly, rewards may be used in lieu of sanctions. Taxes, as well known, have a 
different framing power: unlike sanctions, taxes are not perceived as ways to punish a given 
behavior. Agents themselves choose to pay them, as a price for undertaking an action that is 
not condemned by the tax as illegal. Similarly, a lawmaker may use rewards to prevent 
countervailing effects when he wants to implement a stricter law or to liberalize a given 
action in the face of a strong social opposition. While it is plausible that positive and 
negative incentives (carrots versus sticks) might have comparable expressive and incentive 
effects, it is also likely that they will differ to the extent they trigger social reaction. 
7.   Conclusions 
In this paper, we have analyzed the interaction between law and social norms. The law 
affects human choice by creating incentives and altering the cost of alternative behavioral 
choices. Legal rules can also affect behavior by promoting the individual internalization of 
the values expressed by the law. In this paper, we have shown how the effectiveness of 
legal intervention further depends on the “social response” triggered by the enactment and 
enforcement of a new rule. In general, it is likely that rules that depart from current social 
values may trigger opposition. The dynamic effects of such protest could lead to changes in 
behavior opposite to those intended by the lawmaker. 
 By engaging in protest and disobedience, individuals reveal their values to others. 
This may reinforce others’ dislike of the law and lead to an increased level of legal 
disobedience. When a lawmaker enacts laws that clash with existing social values, those 
social values may be crowded in. We have shown the interesting relationship between the 
expressive effects of the law and the feedback provided by the reaction of society to the 
new law. When society is very reactive to new laws, an increase in the strictness of the law 
may lead to countervailing effects featuring high protest and a higher rate of violations, 
whereas laws that are more lenient could actually help reduce the incidence of the activity. 
The public knowledge of a forthcoming legal change before its coming into force may 
exacerbate the countervailing effects. Given the complementarities between the social 
opposition and the actual violations of the law, a surge in protest may trigger an increase in 
the number of violations before the new law is able to exert its incentive effects. To avoid 
this, lawmakers should minimize the time lag between enactment and enforcement of new 
statutes, or else introduce sunset clauses or proceed with piecemeal legislation to minimize 
                                                 
32 We could of course think of many other strategies. For example, limitation of the freedom of 
speech during the transitory phase would clearly reduce the social reaction, and possibly limit or 




the countervailing effects triggered by widespread social protest. Often, social reaction 
depends on not only the absolute size of the sanction but also on the extent to which it 
changes prior law. Statutes intending to induce substantial shifts from current norms may 
thus have to proceed in a gradual fashion to avoid countervailing effects.  
Finally, our paper points out an interesting and somewhat paradoxical result: 
lawmakers can exploit the countervailing effects of protest and social reaction to increase 
deterrence by means of softer legal enforcement. The idea is that the adoption of more 
lenient laws may prevent the rise of protest, thus avoiding the emergence of a perceived 
social norm that condones or even supports violations. This effect of an increased perceived 
social disapproval counteracts the reduced incentives of the lower sanction. When the 
impact of social norms is sufficiently high, a reduction in the sanction may actually reduce 
violations. 
Future extensions should consider alternative instruments to optimize the net 
deterrence of intervention in a comparable dynamic setting.  For example, when gradual 
adjustments are not possible, lawmakers could adopt instruments such as taxes to avoid 
triggering countervailing effects by taking advantage of the different framing power of 
taxes as opposed to fines or other legal sanctions. More generally, future extensions of our 
analysis should explore the different effect of positive and negative incentives. In incentive 
terms, we generally regard the rewarding of law-abiders as equivalent to the sanctioning of 
law-violators. This equivalence is lost when we take into account the expressive and 
countervailing effects of legal intervention. Our analysis of the countervailing effects of 
legal intervention may also help lawmakers choose the optimal combination of probability 
and magnitude of a penalty when the countervailing effects of legal intervention are 
present. This analysis might quite substantially change the conventional wisdom based on 





A1. Uniqueness of equilibria for p and q 
Lemma 1 proves that, in order to find the long-run equilibrium for p and q we just need to 
look for the long-run equilibria of n. Hence, in our analysis of long-run equilibria, we can 
study the equilibria of the variables n and x: the equilibria of the other variables follows. 
 
LEMMA 1: For every n satisfying  0 n =  , there are  unique levels of p and q satisfying 
0 qp ==  . 
PROOF: Assume 
* n  is a value of n satisfying  0 n =  .  Solving equations (5) and (6), 
respectively for q and p respectively, after substituting 
* nn = , yields 
  ( )
* 1 qF S c n x λ γ =− +− +  (12) 
  ( )
* pF Sc n x λ γ =− − +  (13) 
It is immediate to see that there is a unique value of q and p that satisfies equations (12) and 
(13), since  () F ⋅  is a constant for given n and x. Hence, for any equilibrium value 
* n it is 
possible to determine a unique equilibrium value for q and p. 
 
A2. Shape of the functions 
*() x n  and 
*() nx  







β = −⋅   (14) 
which is always negative, since β>0 and  () g ⋅  takes only positive values, being a 










β = ⋅   (15) 
Since  () g ⋅  is single peaked, it will be negative for high values of the argument B Sn β −−  
(i.e., for positive but low and negative values of n) and positive for low values of the 
argument  (i.e., for high values of n), so that 
*() x n  is convex for low n and concave for 





f Sc x f Sc x
dx
γ γγ =− − + + + +   (16) 







'( ) '( )
dn x
f Sc x fSc x
dx
γ γγ =− − + + + +  (17) 
Then, 
*() nx  is decreasing when either  '( ) f Sc x γ − +  and  '( ) f Sc x γ + +  are both positive 
or  '( ) f Sc x γ −+  is positive and greater than  '( ) f Sc x γ ++ . The function 
*() nx  is  
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increasing when the opposite occurs (one should recall that  () f ⋅  is also single peaked). 
Now,  '( ) f Sc x γ −+  and  '( ) f Sc x γ ++  are both positive for low values of x and both 
negative for high values of x, provided that c is not too large. Thus, the assumptions made 
in Section 3 ( 0 α λ ==, single peakedness of  () g ⋅  and  () f ⋅  and small c) all guarantee that 
*() x n  and 
*() nx  are as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
A3. Stability of Equilibria 
To determine the dynamic stability of equilibria we take the first derivatives of equations 








  () () ()
dn
f Sc x f Sc x
dx
σγγ γ =− − + + + +

 (19) 
The derivative in equation (18) proves that  0 x <   when x > x*(n) and the proportion of 
individuals carrying out action a decreases over time. Similarly, from (19), when n > n*(x), 
0 n <  and the difference between q and p decreases over time. The direction of change is 
illustrated by the solid arrows in Figure 1. Looking at the figure, it is immediate to verify 
that the top-left and the bottom-right equilibria are stable, whereas the middle equilibrium 
is unstable. 
 
Appendix B: Generalizing the model 
 
In Sections 3 through 6 we have made a number of simplifying assumptions in order to get 
simple forms for equations (2’) and (7’) and easily analyze them. In this Appendix, we will 
discuss the effects of giving up such simplifications. It will turn out that our results do not 
hinge on any of the simplifications. On the contrary, relaxing them strengthens our 
argument. 
a. Frequency Dependencies 
In the model we set  0 α λ == in equations (2’) and (7’), so that the dynamics of x did not 
depend on the current value of x and the dynamics of n did not depend on the current value 
of n. As a consequence, it was easy to derive the S-shaped form of the functions  ( ) x n
∗  and 
() nx
∗  by simple reference to uni-modal density functions of  a v  and  n v . Allowing for  0 α >  
and  0 λ >  makes the analysis somewhat more complicated but stronger. Consider the 
partial equilibrium of social norms x first. Equating the time derivative in equation (2) to 
zero, may then yield up to three solutions in x for any given n. Taking the inverse of the 
partial equilibrium function  () x n
∗  so obtained, we get 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 / nx B S x G x α β





− ⋅  stands for the inverse of  ( ) G ⋅ . It is possible to check that   () nx
∗  is a function 
(there is exactly one  () nx
∗  for every x
∗) and that this function is strictly increasing 
whenever  ( ) ( ) 1 gB S nx x αβ α
∗∗ − −+ >  and decreasing elsewhere, since the slope of 
() nx
∗  is given by 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
() ()
1 gB S nx x dn x









as the interested reader may easily verify by taking the total derivative of equation (2) after 
setting  0 x =  . Saying that  ( ) ( ) 1 gB S nx x αβ α
∗∗ − −+ >  holds true is nothing else than 
arguing that either the density function  ( ) g ⋅  takes high values in the relevant range (high 
concentration of probability mass of  a v as assumed in Sections   1 through   0) or that α  is 
sufficiently large, i.e. that there is a strong direct feedback of the frequency x of the action 
on the proportion of individuals willing to carry out the action. If either of these conditions 
is satisfied,  () nx
∗  has an upward sloping part and thus  ( ) x n
∗  is not only S-shaped, but has a 
backward bending part in the middle. In this case, multiple equilibria become more likely, 
which makes our arguments stronger and renders all effects we discuss more likely. 
Similarly, if  () ( ) () 1 fSc n x fS c n x λλ γ λ γ −− + + +− + >, then  () nx
∗  has a 
backwards-bending part, implying that multiplicity of equilibria is more likely and our 
arguments may become valid even if  ( ) x n
∗  is not so strongly S-shaped as we assumed in 
the figures. Interpreting this condition means that our argument is particularly strong, if 
either the probability mass of  n v  is highly concentrated (as assumed in Sections   1 through 
  0) or social norms exhibit a strong positive feedback on their own formation (large λ ). 
One should note that if both  ( ) x n
∗  and  ( ) nx
∗  have backwards-bending parts, more 
equilibria become possible. Out of the nine possible equilibria, four are stable whereas all 
equilibria given by the intersections of the backward bending parts of  ( ) x n
∗  with  () nx
∗  and 
of  () nx
∗  with  ( ) x n
∗  are unstable. Our arguments may easily be extended to this case. 
However, due to the steeper form of the partial equilibrium correspondence  () x n
∗  off its 
backward-bending part, the reverse effect of legal sanctions will be smaller. 
b. Larger Costs of Protest 
A second important simplifying restriction was the restriction to a “sufficiently small” level 
of the part of the costs of expressing one’s opinion that is independent of other individuals’ 
behavior and opinion expression, i.e. the parameter c . Allowing for larger values of c  will 
induce the sum  ( ) ( ) f Sc n x fSc n x λ γλ γ −− + + +− +  to have two local maxima in  x and 
n so that  () ( ) F Sc n x F Sc n x λ γλ γ −− + + +− +  is double-S-shaped in x and n. This  
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double-S-shape transfers to the partial equilibrium function or correspondence  () nx
∗  if λ  is 
small and turns into two backwards bending parts of  ( ) nx
∗  if λ  is large enough. In both 
cases, the number of equilibria may increase, with the same effects as we discussed for high 
frequency dependencies. As there, our argument becomes stronger from relaxing our 
restrictive assumptions. 
c. Multi-Modal Distributions of Valuations 
We also assumed that the densities  ( ) n f v  and  ( ) a g v  are uni-modal. Giving up this 
assumption entails multiple increasing and decreasing parts of the distribution functions 
() F ⋅ . and  () G ⋅  The reader will already anticipate the result: we get double- or multiple-S-
shaped functions or correspondences  ( ) x n
∗  and  ( ) nx
∗ , possibly with backward bending 
parts. As before, this allows for more equilibria and the effects on which we based our 
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Figure 1:  Equilibria: Solid arrows denote direction of dynamics, filled and empty 
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Figure 2:  Shifting the equilibrium functions by an increase in S: Arrows indicate the shift of the 
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Figure 3:  Outcry effect with a decrease in S. The equilibrium goes from e3 (where n is relatively 
close to 0 and prevalence relatively high) to  1 e  , where n is much larger than 0 and x 
has decreased. 